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Abstract:  The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  establish  a  connection between
modelling practices and interpretive approaches in quantum mechanics, taking as a
starting  point  the  literature  on  scientific  representation.  Different  types  of
modalities  (epistemic,  practical,  conceptual  and  natural)  play  different  roles  in
scientific  representation.  I  postulate  that  the  way  theoretical  structures  are
interpreted  in  this  respect  affects  the  way  models  are  constructed.  In  quantum
mechanics,  this  would  be  the  case  in  particular  of  initial  conditions  and
observables.  I  examine  two  formulations  of  quantum  mechanics,  the  standard
wave-function formulation and the consistent histories formulation, and show that
they  correspond  to  opposite  stances,  which  confirms  my  approach.  Finally,  I
examine possible strategies for deciding between these stances.
 1 Interpreting Quantum Mechanics
Can the literature  on scientific  representation,  which is  primarily concerned with modelling
practices, inform us on the interpretation of quantum mechanics?
Debates  in  metaphysics of  science  about  the  interpretation  of  scientific  theories  (in
particular the theories of physics) are usually approached from a perspective that does not really
take into account pragmatic aspects. Rather the question being asked is “What is the world like
if the theory is true?”,  assuming the theory  is “interpreted literally”, or “taken at face value”.
Generally,  the whole universe is considered as the proper object  of  inquiry,  even though in
practice,  theories  are  more  often  used  to  represent  bounded  systems.  Scientific  realism  is
implicitly assumed, at least as a working hypothesis: scientific models are taken to accurately
represent a mind-independent reality.  However, in practice, model construction is sensitive to
the purposes of epistemic agents, and the models that are used to represent physical systems are
idealised, and not taken to represent their objects with perfect accuracy in all respects. In this
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sense,  the  metaphysics  of  science  takes  an  idealistic  stance  that  abstracts  away  from  the
messiness of concrete representational activities. A justification for this approach could be that
this messiness is not an essential  feature of representation, but  a contingent aspect inherent to
our practical limitations, and that it could be overcome in principle. The debates on scientific
representation would not be directly relevant to metaphysics for this reason.
This stance could seem unproblematic if understood as a working hypothesis allowing us to
inquire into what exists independently of our activities, a “view from nowhere”. In the case of
quantum mechanics, however, the fruitfulness of this working hypothesis is questionable. It is
not clear what a “literal interpretation” of the theory means. On the one hand, the standard
textbook  formulation of  quantum mechanics  has  instrumentalist  flavours:  it  does  not  really
present us with a realist interpretation of the theory. The anthropocentric notion of measurement
is explicitly mentioned and left unanalysed. On the other hand, so-called realist interpretations
do not  always take this formulation “at face value”. They often complete  the formalism with
additional structure, for example particle positions  in  Bohmian mechanics, and they disagree
with each other. Non-realist  interpretive programs,  such as QBism, are developed alongside
realist  ones,  and  they give  us  interesting  insights  into the  theory.  There  is  not  one  “literal
interpretation” of the theory. What was supposed to be the ground for metaphysical analysis,
stemming from a harmless working hypothesis, ends up being open to controversies.
For these reasons, it  might be interesting to take a step back and have a closer look at
representational practices, for a better understanding of what “interpreting” really means: how
exactly  are  physical systems  represented  in  quantum  mechanics?  Asking  what  interpreting
means  is just asking for the semantics of a scientific theory, and here, I wish to advocate an
approach that is analogous to attempts, in philosophy of language, to elucidate meaning in terms
of use (Wittgenstein 1953; Grice 1968). The idea is the following: in order to understand what a
scientific theory says, one should first have a look at how the theory is used to represent the
world. Pragmatist  aspects are no substitute for a metaphysical picture, and perhaps some of
these aspects are indeed contingent rather than essential. But this doesn't mean that pragmatics
is not informative at all.  In a situation where interpretive approaches proliferate without any
resolution in sight, there is no good reason to abstract pragmatics away.
Examining  the  imports  of  the  pragmatics  of  representation  for  interpretive  issues  in
metaphysics is an ambitious project that would not fit in a single paper. My more modest aim in
this  article  is  to  outline  a  strategy  that  could  be  employed for  this  purpose.  It consists  in
establishing relationships between interpretive stances and modelling practices. I will argue that
certain ways of constructing models in order to represent the world are more compatible with
some  interpretive stances than others. I will  illustrate these connections between  interpretive
stances and  modelling  practices  by  examining two  formulations  of  quantum  mechanics.
Establishing such connections  opens the way for  new argumentative strategies  for  deciding
between one or the other interpretive stance, which I will sketch at the end of this article.
This  article  makes  heavy use  of  the  philosophical  notion  of  modality,  which  refers  to
discourse about the possible and the necessary. There are various types of modality: logical,
conceptual, epistemic, practical, metaphysical or nomological. The reason why I am employing
this philosophical tool is that I am convinced that interpreting the modal structures of a theory in
terms of these various types of modality is key to understanding “what the theory says”. This is
particularly true in quantum mechanics, where, for example, probabilities are interpreted either
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as objective chance (nomological possibilities)  or  subjective degrees  of  credence (epistemic
possibilities),  depending  on  the  interpretation  (Frigg  and  Hoefer  2007;  Wallace  2007).  My
methodology  consists  in  examining  the  role  that  different  types  of  modality  play  in
representation. Then,  by examining how theoretical structures are used in model construction,
one can give a certain interpretation to these structures in modal terms. This is how I propose to
establish connections between modelling practices and interpretive stances.
In  section 2,  I  present  recent  developments  in  the  philosophical  literature  on  scientific
representation. In section 3, I provide a short analysis of the role of various types of modalities
(conceptual, epistemic, practical and natural) in representation. In section 4, I attempt to identify
which modal structure of non-relativistic quantum theory plays which representational role, so
as to match them with types of modalities. This attempt fails, but in an interesting way: there is
a latency over how to build a quantum mechanical model, but each option can be associated
with  a  particular  interpretive stance.  I  call  the  two  main  stances  that  one  can  adopt  the
objectivist and  the  perspectivist stance.  In  section  5,  I  show  that  the  objectivist  stance
corresponds to the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, where models describe wave-
functions  evolving  in  time,  and  that  the  perspectivist  stance corresponds  to  the  consistent
histories formulation, where models describe correlations between possible “contextual events”.
I examine how the two  formulations differ in terms of natural ontological commitments, and
argue that these differences confirm the validity of the methodology adopted. Finally, in section
6,  I  argue  that  this  methodology  offers  new potential  strategies  for  evaluating  interpretive
options.
 2 Scientific Representation
Scientific theories were once conceived of as general statements about the world expressed in a
theoretical language. The question of interpretation boiled down to the question of providing a
semantics  for  theoretical  terms,  by connecting them to observational  terms,  and this  was a
question that fell under the scope of philosophy of language. The difficulties of this positivist
project are well known, and nowadays, scientific theories are generally conceived of as families
of  models,  where  models  are  abstract  entities,  for  example,  set-theoretical  structures,  that
represent target systems. In empirical confrontation, theoretical models are directly compared to
other structures: data models (Suppe 1972; van Fraassen 1980).
This model-based approach does not really solve nor dissolve the problem of what theories
“mean” in a general sense: it merely pushes back this problem, which now falls under the scope
of the topic of scientific representation. The question concerns the relation between models and
what they represent. Initially, it was thought that relations such as isomorphism  or similarity
could be enough to account for representation, but these accounts have been criticized for not
being directional (the relation involved  is symmetric and reflexive,  while the representation
relation  is  not),  and  for  conflating  representation  and  accuracy  (it  is  possible  to  represent
something inaccurately (Suárez 2003)).
These  shortcomings  have  motivated  a  move  towards  user-centred  accounts  of
representation. Representing is at least a three-place relationship between a user, a vehicle and a
target.  Some would add other components, for example, purposes  (Bailer-Jones 2013; Giere
2010a). The user takes the model to denote its target, which ensures directionality and does not
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guarantee  accuracy.  Models  are  generally  idealised:  some  aspects  of  the  target  take  more
importance  than  others,  some  are  wilfully  neglected,  and  this  depends  on  the  aims  of  the
modeller.
According to a minimalist understanding of scientific representation, representing a system
is,  for  an  epistemic  agent,  using  a  source  (for  example,  an  abstract  mathematical  structure
described  by  equations  on  paper)  to  make  inferences  on  a  target.  Whether  one  can  say
something  more  substantial  is  a  subject  of  controversy.  Suárez  (2004) claims  that
representational activities are too disparate to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the
representation relation to take place, while others attempt to provide more substantive accounts.
Contessa  (2007) for  example,  claims that  it  is  sufficient  that  a  mapping  be given between
components of a model (objects, properties, relations) and components of the target system for
the model to represent the target.  Any mapping will  do. Even more liberally,  Callender and
Cohen (2006) have  defended that  stipulation  by  the agent  is  enough for  the  representation
relation to take place. But others have objected that such liberalism is unfit for accounting for
epistemic  representation  in  general,  and  scientific  representation  in  particular.  Epistemic
vehicles have a distinctive role, which is to “allow their users to have access […] to aspects of
their targets” (Liu 2015). Stipulation is not enough to fulfil this role. These liberal conceptions
of representation also fail to account for communal aspects: what a given scientific model can
represent  depends  on  the history  of  the  model,  its  construction  and reception  by  scientific
community.  A model  must  be  licensed  by  the  community  as  a  representation  of  its  target
(Boesch 2017). This licensing aspect is responsive to empirical and theoretical aims: not any
mapping  between  the  vehicle  and  target  will  do,  and  something  more  than  stipulation  is
involved.
There is still no consensus on the exact nature of scientific representation. However, it is
possible, without taking sides, to give a  list of potential constraints on the establishment of a
representation  relation  between  a  model  and  a  target  system.  These  constraints  can  be
understood as  limiting  the sets of  interpreted models  that  are  apt  to  represent  a target  of  a
particular type in a particular context (where the context includes the purposes of epistemic
agents). They can be classified as follows:
1) Conceptual constraints: Is the model a legitimate vehicle of representation according
to the epistemic community? Is it a proper use of scientific concepts?
2) Practical constraints: Is the model appropriate for the particular purpose of the user in
context?  Are  objects  and  properties  of  interest  for  this  purpose  represented?  Are
standards of precision sufficient? Is the model simple enough to be used?
3) Epistemic  constraints:  Does  the  model  correspond,  in  relevant  respects,  to  the
particular target, given the empirical inputs available to the user?
Constraints  of  the  first  type  are  a-contextual.  Whether  or  not  scientific  concepts are
properly used does not depend on the particular target system being represented, nor on the
purposes of the user. Constraints of the second and third type are contextual. They differ in the
direction of fit: for the second type of constraint, the model must fit our aims, while for the third
one, it must fit the world.
Does considering these constraints shed light on the way a theory should be interpreted in
terms of ontological commitments? I believe that it does. Contextual (practical and epistemic)
constraints  can  be  interpreted  as  being  a  matter  of  correctly  identifying  the  target  of
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representation,  and  not  as  a  matter  of  content:  the  user  wants  the  model  to  represent  one
particular  target  system for  one  particular  purpose:  for  example,  a  concrete  pendulum of  a
certain length, with a focus on its position along a particular axis. In this sense, these constraints
are merely selective. They do not determine “what the model says”, but rather “what the model
is about”. Conceptual constraints correspond to the content of a theory: its laws and principles
(for example, the laws of Newtonian mechanics). They determine the cognitive content of the
model more directly. However, they can only be applied once the target of representation has
been identified in  context  (these conceptual  constraints  can be analysed as  a function from
context  to content).  So,  it  is  of  crucial  importance,  for delineating the cognitive  content  of
models, to examine the interplay of these three types of constraints.
 3 Modalities
Let us connect the aspects just mentioned to modalities, so as to outline the methodology of this
paper. Interestingly, the collection of models of a theory, for example, the set of Newtonian
systems, is  sometimes viewed as a modal structure, each model representing a possible world
according to the theory1. This way of putting things has metaphysical overtones, in particular if
the modality involved is interpreted as nomological (what must be true according to the laws of
nature). Furthermore, scientific models do not, in general, represent the universe as a whole.
However, we can make the more neutral claim that each model of the theory is a possible way a
target system could, in principle, be represented within the theory. The set of models of the
theory  thus  provides  a  set  of  conceptual possibilities  for  representing  a  concrete system.
Conceptual possibilities correspond, in general, to what is not precluded by a proper grasp of the
concepts involved in a description. This is indeed the case for the models of a theory, insofar as
they respect the conceptual content of the theory: its general laws and principles.
This  idea of identifying the models of a theory with conceptual possibilities provides a
direct way of analysing the constraints listed in the previous section in modal terms. A set of
models  is conceptually relevant in virtue of respecting the general laws and principles of the
theory, which are conceptual constraints.  It corresponds to the set of all models of the theory
(for example, the set of Newtonian systems). Then a subset of this first set is practically relevant
given our purposes, and another subset is epistemically relevant given our prior knowledge of
the particular target2, assuming a certain interpretation of these models in terms of the target (for
example, models of pendulum with specific parameter values, interpreted in terms of a concrete
pendulum). The intersection of these two subsets gives us the set of interpreted models that are
apt to represent the target in a particular context. In sum, each type of constraint gives us a set of
possibilities  for  representing  the  target,  and  these possibilities  are  conceptual,  practical  and
epistemic respectively. Formally speaking, these constraints act as relations of necessity that
limit the set of available possibilities, since they limit the set of acceptable models3.
1 This is at least the case for the theories of physics, which are the main focus of this paper.
2 This is consistent with the idea that epistemic possibilities are a subset of conceptual possibilities, 
which are a subset of logical possibilities, which, in this case, would correspond to the set of all 
mathematical structures.
3 Note that I am not trying to capture the process of model construction, but the final product. 
Presumably, scientists start from epistemic and practical constraints and then use conceptual 
inferences to construct an appropriate model. In retrospect, the constraints from which they started 
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Applying these constraints does not guarantee that the model is an accurate representation
of the target: only that the representation relation takes place. However, we can presume that
they determine  conditions of  accuracy.  If,  by  analogy  with  truth-conditional  semantics  in
philosophy of language, we identify conditions of accuracy and cognitive content, then these
constraints determine the cognitive content of the model. Presumably, whether these conditions
of accuracy are satisfied by the target system depends on a form of correspondence between
relevant parts of the model and relevant aspects of the target, or perhaps relevant parts of the
relation between the target, the user and the environment.
One further aspect should not be neglected: scientific models generally have an internal
modal structure. They often describe various possibilities for the target system. This is notably
the  case  for probabilistic  models,  where  various  possible  states for  the  target  system  are
represented and weighted. This internal structure is determined by the constraints above, in the
sense  that  applying  these  constraints  allows  the  user  to  select  a  particular  model  with  a
particular  internal  structure.  However, contrarily  to  the  possibilities  analysed  so  far,  the
associated possibilities do not  correspond to the choice of the right model for representing a
given target: they are represented within models. This means that conditions of accuracy are not
extensional, but intensional: the content of a model is, in general, modal.
If  these  “internal”  possibilities  were epistemic,  that  is,  if  they  corresponded  to  our
ignorance of the real state of the target system, I think it would make sense to understand them
as having to do with model choice, and to interpret the corresponding probabilities as weighing
up  different  possible  sub-models  (at  least  for  philosophical  analyses).  The probabilities
associated  with  these  possibilities would not  represent  aspects  of  the  target,  but  rather  our
knowledge  or  expectation  of the  target.  They  would  typically  be  evaluated  by  taking  into
account measurement errors, for  example.  However, when it comes to representing the target
alone, and not our belief state, the proper units of representation are the weighted structures, that
is,  the  sub-models,  and not  their  combination.  So,  epistemic modalities can in  principle  be
“externalised”, and interpreted in terms of our ignorance about which model actually represents
the target. But once this is done, the resulting units of representation might still have an internal
modal structure that should be interpreted, and I think that in this case, the proper interpretation
is  in  terms  of  natural  or  nomological modalities:  what  the  model  represents  is  a  set  of
possibilities “out there, in the world”, a set of ways the target could be in virtue of natural
constraints. Such a model is able to support counterfactual reasoning of the type “if this were to
happen,  this  would  result”.  If  we  didn't  accept  this,  it  would  be  hard  to  account  for  the
explanatory role of scientific models and for causal inferences, given that explanations and talk
of causes and effects often involve counterfactual reasoning (Saatsi and Pexton 2013).
Note that I am not trying to impose a metaphysical interpretation of scientific models here.
I am merely proposing an association between their content and this interpretation,  that is, a
semantics. A modal sceptic who thinks that the world is a mosaic of actual facts should consider
that the right units of representation are models with no internal modal structure, because this is
can be seen as restrictions on the space of available conceptual possibilities. Relations of necessity 
can be approached inferentially, or semantically, and the two approaches are complementary. Also 
note that this is a simplification, because models do not always strictly satisfy the laws of a theory, for
example when approximations are used, and they often incorporate domain-specific postulates. 
However, I will neglect these complications here.
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what the world is like. In so far as models do have this internal structure, either they should be
decomposed into  more  basic  models,  or  they  should  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  natural  or
nomological possibilities.
I should also stress that I don't consider this association between models and interpretations
to  be  as  strict  as,  say,  logical  entailment.  Of  course,  it  is  always  possible  for  someone  to
integrate a modal structure within a model and then claim: “actually, I take this structure to
represent my state of knowledge, not real possibilities”. The point is that this claim does not go
without saying: this person is simply acting as if she was assuming that this structure represents
natural possibilities, whereas if she was pondering several models, she would be acting as if in a
state  of  uncertainty  about  which  model  represents  the  target.  So,  some  modelling  choices
naturally induce a certain metaphysical picture of the represented object, and conversely. This
can be turned into a normative claim: modelling choices are not necessarily innocuous, and
when it  comes to philosophical  analysis,  one should use the model  structures that  naturally
match their  intended metaphysical  interpretation,  so as  to avoid being misled by modelling
choices. Having said that, I will argue that this connection is robust enough to correspond to the
way that scientific models are typically interpreted in the scientific and philosophical literature. 
Accepting  this  analysis,  there  seems  to  be  an  important  divide  between  two  kinds  of
modalities:
• Mind-independent  (natural/nomological) modalities are  represented; they correspond
to the internal structure of models. They describe what could happen for a given target.
• Mind-dependent (epistemic, practical) modalities are about choosing the right model;
they correspond to possible targets or possible ways of representing a target.
Conceptual modalities connect these two kinds of modalities: given epistemic and practical
constraints, one can deploy conceptual resources so as to construct or select the right model for
a  particular  target.  If  the  selected model  has  an internal  modal  structure,  then it  represents
natural constraints on the phenomena. In this sense, the conceptual necessity associated with the
content of a theory is a function from context to content: it tells us which natural constraints one
should posit given epistemic and practical constraints.
The relevant question in order to decide if a given modal structure, for example a range of
possible values for a parameter, corresponds to the first or the second type of modality appears
to be: does fixing this value amount to identifying the target of representation, eliminating our
ignorance about the target, for example, or is it merely about considering one possible way the
target, already identified, could be in virtue of its nature, irrelevant of how it actually is? Given
the remarks made in this section, in the former case, said value should be fixed within models,
such that changing the value would correspond to changing the target and model, and in the
latter  case,  it should remain  variable in the model,  representing natural  possibilities for the
target.  This  value might be  fixed  later,  for  example,  when  using  the  model  for  inferences
(including  counterfactual  inferences),  but  it  is  not  fixed  during  the  process  of  model
construction.
 4 Application to Quantum Mechanics
We now have a tool for interpreting the modal structures of a theory. The structures that are
fixed  within models should be interpreted as corresponding to mind-dependent (epistemic or
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practical)  possibilities,  having  to  do  with  the  correct  identification  of  the  target  of
representation,  since  the  corresponding  possibility  is fixed  by  the  process  of  selecting  the
“right” model.  The structures that are variable, such that various possibilities are represented
within the model, should be interpreted as mind-independent (natural) possibilities for identified
targets. Let us apply this tool to the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, so as to test its
validity.
The following  elements are  typically  involved in  model  construction  and inferences  in
quantum mechanics:
• A state  space (configuration space or  Hilbert  space) and an algebra  of observables,
representing the relevant degrees of freedom of the target system.
• Dynamical  constraints  on  the  state  space  (Schrödinger  equation,  a  Hamiltonian,
boundary conditions),  associated with the specific physical configuration of the target
system.
• Specific observables or combinations thereof indexed in time, generally representing
“what is measured” on the system.
• Initial conditions (vector or density matrix), representing the initial state in which the
system is prepared or first observed4.
One can make probabilistic predictions by fixing all these elements and then applying the
Born rule.
These four elements have a modal character, in the sense that they can be instantiated in
various possible ways: possible state spaces, possible dynamics, possible values for dynamical
parameters,  possible  observables,  etc. The  question  is:  how  shall  we  interpret  this  modal
character? Which of these  elements are part of the identity conditions for target systems, and
which are naturally contingent  aspects of  identified targets? Which should be interpreted in
terms of epistemic or practical possibilities, and which should be interpreted in terms of natural
possibilities? Applying our new tool, these questions can be reframed as: which elements should
be fixed within a model, and which should remain variable?
The answer to this question might depend on the context of use, and in particular, on the
level of abstraction involved. Perhaps, for example, a scientist working on foundational issues
in quantum mechanics would like to keep all elements variable, so as to consider any possible
type  of  target,  while  a  scientist  making  predictions  will  fix  all  components.  A scientist
presenting an explanation for some phenomena would probably work with a model in between
these two extremes,  fixing enough  elements to identify the phenomena to be explained, but
keeping  enough  components variable  for  counterfactual  reasoning.  In  some  contexts,  only
certain aspects  of  the  algebra  of  the  observables  could be fixed (for  example,  their  tensor-
product form). There seems to be a hierarchy of models, as observed by  Giere 1999 (ch. 6),
where each level in the hierarchy makes the level above more precise by fixing the value of a
component that was kept variable at this upper level. So, there seems to be no absolute fact of
the matter as to whether a given theoretical structure should be considered a representation of
natural possibilities, with all possibilities appearing in the model, or as an epistemic or practical
possibility that should be fixed by the relevant inputs.
4 They can be replaced by final conditions in the case of retrodictions, or by any relevant input 
concerning the properties of the system at a particular time. In the following, I will only consider 
initial conditions, but my analyses can easily be transposed.
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Note that this is not inconsistent with the analysis of the previous section. It only means
that a structure that corresponds to natural possibilities in an abstract context can become an
epistemic or practical possibility in a more concrete context. Once we start wondering which out
of a set  of  natural  possibilities is realized,  for instance,  we trade a natural  modality for an
epistemic one.
Having said that, Giere also claims that there is a more salient level of abstraction, what he
calls a basic level. It corresponds to a level that is sufficiently abstract to be useful in various
contexts, and sufficiently concrete for the various potential targets of the model to share a high
degree of similarity. Giere bases this claim on research in cognitive psychology on concepts and
categories.  We could also suspect that there is a privileged way of  selecting a path down the
hierarchy of models.  For example, it does not make sense to fix  initial conditions in a model
without  fixing the state space,  because  initial conditions are defined as regions of the state
space. Observables and dynamical constraints are also expressed in terms of the state space. So,
a model should at least have a fixed state space to be of any use. I would say that dynamical
constraints should also be fixed prior to  initial conditions and observables, at least for bound
systems,  because  without  dynamical  constraints,  initial conditions  and  observables  are  idle
(except perhaps for static systems, but then an implicit dynamics is provided)5.
Let  us assume that  there  is  a  salient level  of  abstraction for  representation in  quantum
mechanics, that it is the proper level for philosophical analysis, and that the models at this level
incorporate at least a fixed state-space and fixed dynamical constraints. This means that these
two components  are  associated with a correct  identification of  the  target  system,  given the
purposes and prior knowledge of the user of the model. This idea makes sense: in general, a user
will be interested in particular quantities, which determine a particular state space. Typically,
quantum mechanical models can represent an electron by focusing only on its spin, without
integrating position and velocity in Hilbert space. The user will also be interested in a particular
physical configuration, which implies the choice of a dynamics: as noted above, in general, a
model would not be very informative without it.
Things are less clear for the two remaining elements. Should a model at the basic level of
abstraction incorporate fixed observables? Fixed  initial conditions? Or should we keep these
elements variable? Are they a matter of identification of the target of representation, or do they
support counterfactual reasoning?
Let us first consider  observables. On the one hand,  it is quite intuitive to associate  them
with the particular interests of users:  users are interested in this or that quantity of  a physical
system that  they  plan to measure.  In such a context,  the set  of  possible observables would
correspond to practical possibilities, that is, to a choice of model, and they will be fixed within
every  selected  model.  One  could  also  associate  observables  with  epistemic  possibilities,
5 This observation cannot be generalised to unbounded systems. A counterexample (that I owe to an 
anonymous reviewer) is scattering theory, where the Hamiltonian is variable while initial conditions 
and observables are fixed. This could entail that the conclusions of this article are limited to the 
representation of some systems, notably bound systems. Further analyses beyond the scope of this 
paper would be required to address this potential limitation. However, the representation of bound 
systems remains canonical in physics, in particular when it comes to interpretive issues, and I hope 
that the analyses provided in what follows are still valuable as a demonstration of the fruitfulness of 
the methodological approach presented in this article..
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remarking  that  what  is  measured  can  be  determined  by  considering  a  larger  situation  that
comprises the initial  target  and the environment.  Observables can be fixed by invoking the
theory of decoherence, for example. The two approaches are not incompatible: the direction of
fit for observables (purposes or empirical inputs) could depend on the context.
On the other hand, it is also quite intuitive to think that what is measured on a system is
external to the  system, and that  this measurement is not part of its nature or identity.  It could
therefore  seem  odd to  associate  observables  with  a  correct  identification  of  the  target  of
representation  (Bell  (2004)’s  disdain  of  the  anthropocentric  notion  of  measurement  can  be
invoked to this effect).  We can imagine that scientists  are generally interested in a particular
target without presuming that something specific will be measured on this target. In this case,
we would naturally consider that observables are variable rather than fixed. From the point of
view of the target system itself, measurements are natural contingencies: various systems of the
same type can interface with their environment in various ways. So, observables should not be
fixed at the basic level of abstraction6.
What has just been said about observables could also be said about initial conditions. On
the one hand, initial conditions could correspond to either practical possibilities in a context
where a system is prepared in a certain state for specific purposes, or to epistemic possibilities if
the purpose is to learn about a system in a certain state. On the other hand, it is in general
possible, in quantum mechanics, to consider that the initial state of a system is nothing but the
outcome of a first measurement (preparing a system in a particular state then implies filtering
targets on the basis of this first measurement), and we could consider this outcome a natural
contingency.  So,  there  does  not  seem to  be  a  clear  answer  to  our  question  as  to  whether
observables and initial conditions should be fixed or kept variable.
I  hope  that  the  idea  that  different  interpretive  stances  can  be  associated  with  different
modelling practices starts to make sense at this point. Various ways of identifying the relevant
targets of representation yield different modelling choices, depending in particular on whether
or not measurement setups and preparation procedures should be considered relevant inputs for
this identification. What is at stake is a choice concerning the hierarchy between observables
and  initial conditions, or the path that should be followed down the hierarchy of models.  If
observables take priority over initial conditions, then they can be fixed by epistemic or practical
constraints, while possible initial conditions would be natural contingencies represented within
models. This choice corresponds to a certain way of identifying targets of representation: as
particular physical configurations viewed “from a perspective”, that is, relative to a measuring
environment. In this case, representation is perspectival in the sense that an anthropocentric
element, associated with measurements, is involved in the identification of the target. We could
also talk about  relational  identity,  since  the  target  is  identified  in  relation to  its  measuring
6 I should note that another option consists in fixing a privileged observable at the conceptual level, 
and not at the practical or epistemic level. This option corresponds to Bohmian mechanics, which 
specifies that the positions of particles have definite values, whatever the model. In this case, the right
observable could be considered a matter of natural (or even metaphysical) necessity, because it has 
nothing to do with the identification of the target. Note, however, that it is debatable whether fixing a 
“privileged basis” such as position at the conceptual level amounts to fixing observables: a distinct 
notion of observable that is independent from this privileged basis can be seen as supervening on the 
relation between a system and its environment.
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environment. If, on the other hand, initial conditions take priority over observables, then they
could be fixed by epistemic or practical constraints,  while observables would correspond to
natural contingencies. The target of representation is now identified as an autonomous object or
type of object in a determinate state that can be measured in different ways, and the way it is
measured is a natural contingency. Its identity is intrinsic7.
Two main stances emerge from this analysis8. Let us  call them the  perspectivist and the
objectivist stance:
• Perspectivist stance:  At the basic level of abstraction, observables are fixed but not
initial conditions, because objects are represented from a perspective, associated with a
focus on particular quantities being measured. The initial conditions in which physical
systems are found are natural contingencies.9
• Objectivist stance: At the basic level of abstraction, initial conditions are fixed, but not
observables, because targets of representation are objects in a determinate state existing
autonomously. What is measured on them is not part of their identity: it is a natural
contingency.
We can see how the analysis of the role of modalities in representation from section 3 bears
fruit. I claimed that the content of a theory (the conceptual constraints on representation) could
be analysed as a function from context (epistemic and practical constraints) to cognitive content
(natural possibilities). The two stances presented above differ in what they take to be part of the
context, and what they take to be part of the content, and so, they imply different interpretations
of  possible  initial  conditions  and  observables,  as  either  epistemic/practical  or  natural
possibilities. This, in turn, implies different ways of considering the target of representation (see
figures  1  and 2).  We will  see  in  the  next  section  that  it  also  implies  different  ontological
interpretations of the theory.
7 The fact that the Hilbert space and algebra of observables are fixed, and potentially reflect a focus 
from the user of the model on particular properties of interest, could let us think that representation is 
perspectival in all cases. However, it is perspectival only in a weak sense, because of the selective 
interests of users, but properties of interest could still be objective. One can reasonably assume that 
the Hilbert space could be completed with new properties without affecting the initial content of the 
model. Fixing an observable makes the model perspectival in a stronger sense, insofar as observables 
are associated with the anthropocentric notion of measurement, and affect the content of the model.
8 Two more stances could have been considered: fixing everything, or fixing nothing at the basic level 
of abstraction (and perhaps still others considering unbounded systems: see footnote 5). However, 
they are less interesting because they do not specify a priority between observable and initial 
conditions, so I will leave them out.
9 This perspectivist stance could be compared to perspectivist positions in epistemology, such as  Giere
(2010b) and Massimi (2018)’s perspectival realism. The notion of perspective involved here is 
arguably more local, since it concerns a focus on some properties for a concrete target of 
representation, while perspectival realism puts emphasis on relativity to a conceptual scheme, a 
theoretical lexicon or epistemic norms of justification at a more general level. Nevertheless, there 
could be interested connections between the two, notably because one of the motivations of 
perspectival realism is to account for the successful use of incompatible models to represent a single 
target system. There is no place to explore these connections here.
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Figure 1: Objectivist model Figure 2: Perspectivist model
We could have hoped that our association between modalities  and roles in representation
would provide us with a straightforward interpretation of scientific theories in general, and of
quantum  mechanics  in  particular,  but  our  approach  appears  to  be  insufficient:  rather  than
helping us determine the right way of interpreting modal structures, it leaves  several options
open. However, there is still an improvement, since we are now able to associate specific kinds
of models with specific interpretive stances, and we can have a look at the kinds of models that
are actually used by scientists to see what they imply.
 5 Stances and Formulations
Let us examine two types of quantum mechanical models. The first type of model is the one
found in textbooks: the wave-function evolving with time. This kind of model is probably the
most widely used by physicists and philosophers of physics.  It is  the one generally used for
presenting the theory and examining foundational issues. The second type of model is the one
proposed by the consistent histories formulation of quantum mechanics (Griffiths 2003). It has
been applied to quantum cosmology (Craig 2016), quantum gravity (Carlip 2001) and quantum
computation (e.g. Arrasmith et al. 2019; Brun and Hartle 1999). Although less often used than
the wave-function formulation, it played a prominent role in the development of the notion of
decoherence, which is now central in contemporary physics. It is very similar to Feynman's path
integral  formulation,  and I  think that  the  same considerations  will  apply to  both.  The path
integral formulation is used for more concrete applications of the theory. What I will show is
that  these  two  types  of  models,  the  wave-function  and  consistent  histories,  make opposite
choices with regards to the status of observables and initial conditions, and these modelling
choices  correspond precisely to the objectivist  and the perspectivist  stances described in the
previous section.
A standard wave-function model can be constructed roughly as follows: take (1) a Hilbert
space and an algebra of observables, (2) a vector or density matrix defined on this Hilbert space
representing the initial  state  of  the  system and (3)  a  Hamiltonian,  which is  an operator  on
Hilbert space. Then apply a law of evolution to the initial state using the Schrödinger equation
with this Hamiltonian. This gives a state (vector or density matrix) for the system at any instant,
the wave-function. Now, in order to connect the model to empirical data, the Born rule should
be applied, taking an observable as input. The Born rule gives a probability distribution for all
the  eigenvalues  of  the  observable  (interpreted  as  all  possible  outcomes  for  a  measurement
corresponding to this observable). But the observable is not part of the model: the same model
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can be used for any choice of observable. In this respect, the observable remains variable in the
model: it is only fixed when particular inferences, including counterfactual inferences, are made
using the model. The structure of possible observables is indirectly represented in the model: it
is given by the algebra of observables from which the wave-function is defined.
We have a perfect illustration of the objectivist stance: the idea is that what is measured is
external to the target system itself. If our account of the role of modalities in representation of
section 3 is correct, this means that the user of such a model should consider what is measured
on the target to be a natural contingency: all measurements are naturally possible. Initial states
should correspond to epistemic or practical modalities that are fixed  by empirical or practical
inputs. They are part of the identity of the target. The target is taken to be an object that exists
independently  of its  environment,  and whose intrinsic  properties  determine  the  outcome of
possible  measurements.  Since  measurements  could  be  made at  any  time,  the  target must
continuously have a state in time, the evolution of which is given by a law. Interpreting the
model “literally” naturally gives us an ontology of physical states and laws of evolution.
This  approach is  plagued with interpretational  difficulties.  In  particular,  the  ontological
status of the Born rule (whether or not it corresponds to a physical process) is unclear, which
gives  rise  to  the  infamous  measurement  problem  (Maudlin  1995).  The  wave-function  is
infinitely  extended  in  time,  which  seems  idealistic.  Since  the  correspondence  between  the
content of the model and measurement outcomes is mediated by the Born rule, the ontological
interpretation  of  the  wave-function  is  also  unclear:  the  wave-function does  not  attribute
properties to entities that are well-located in space, and several ontological options are available
(Belot 2012). However, any attempt to complete the theory to solve these issues results in non-
locality,  which  is  in  contradiction  with  relativity  theory,  and  the  way  of  completing  it is
underdetermined.  Finally,  extracting causal  relations  from this  representation  is  problematic
(Elby 1992), and since causality is a central concept in higher-level disciplines, the relation
between  the  fundamental  theory  and  higher-level  representations,  such  as  those  found  in
chemistry,  biology,  or  classical  physics,  remains  unclear.  Yet  this  is  the  approach  usually
followed for interpretive purposes. Also note that if the initial state of the system can be given
by a first measurement, then assuming that the system exists independently of all measurements
introduces an epistemic uncertainty with regards to this initial state.
Let us now examine the consistent histories formulation. In this formulation, one also starts
from a Hilbert space and algebra of observables, but a model is constructed first by defining a
framework, which is a set of possible histories for the represented system. A history is a finite
sequence of projectors in Hilbert space indexed at particular instants. Each projector represents
a possible property for the system, for example, being located in a particular spatial region, or
having spin up. A history therefore represents a time sequence of properties in which the system
could be found at particular instants (typically, a sequence of possible measurement outcomes).
A framework is a set of mutually exclusive histories, one of which actually occurs (in technical
terms, these histories are projectors on a tensor product of Hilbert spaces indexed in time, and
these projectors are orthogonal and sum to unity). This defines a sample space for probabilistic
reasoning, which can be used to generate an event algebra by considering histories that are the
disjunction  of  other histories  (coarse-graining).  Finally,  the  histories  of  a  framework  must
satisfy  a  consistency  condition,  which  depends  on  the  Hamiltonian  of  the  system.  This
consistency condition (or  “decoherence condition”)  will  guarantee that  the  inferences  made
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within  the  framework respect  standard  probability  calculus.  With  respect  to  the  standard
formalism of quantum mechanics, providing a framework is roughly equivalent to providing a
set of observables indexed at particular times, where the observables can be coarse-grained and
must respect the consistency condition.  Properties then correspond to the eigenvalues of these
observables,  and  the  histories  of  the  framework  correspond  to  all  possible  sequences  of
properties.
Once the framework is provided, the Hamiltonian and a generalisation of the Born rule can
be used to determine the conditional probabilities of any two projectors in the framework. These
conditional  probabilities  constitute  the  model.  What  we  have is,  roughly speaking,  a set  of
correlations (or transition probabilities) between the possible outcomes (eigenvalues) of every
observable specified by the framework. These correlations respect standard probability calculus.
As said earlier, this is guaranteed by the consistency condition that the framework must respect,
which depends on the Hamiltonian. Note, importantly, that assigning conditional probabilities to
pairs of projectors does not amount to assigning probabilities to the histories of the framework
directly. This would require having more information, such as initial or final  conditions  or a
probability distribution on initial or final  conditions, but such information is not given by the
dynamics of the system itself, and it is not part of the model (Griffiths 2003, ch. 9).
As we can see, the modelling choices adopted here are exactly the opposite of the previous
ones,  and they correspond to  the  perspectivist  stance.  In  both cases,  the  Hilbert  space and
Hamiltonian are fixed in the model, but whereas in the previous case, the initial condition was
fixed and observables served as inputs for making inferences from the model, in the present
case, the observables are fixed  in the model, and the initial  condition (which here is just the
outcome of the first measurement)  is variable and can serve as input for inferences, including
for  counterfactual  inferences.  According  to  our  analysis  in section  3,  observables  (the
framework)  correspond  to  practical  or  epistemic  possibilities  in  the  consistent  histories
formulation, while  initial conditions are natural contingencies (which is indeed how Griffiths
(2003, ch. 9) considers them).
We  have  seen  that  a  wave-function  model  is  naturally  interpreted  in  terms  of  an
autonomous state evolving according to a law. The ontology that one could read off a consistent
histories model is quite different. First, the target is not an autonomous object, but it is defined
relative to a framework. According to Griffiths, the latter is entirely associated with a pragmatic
choice from the user of the model (its correspondence with what is measured in an experimental
situation  is  actually  a  matter  of  convenience).  The  identity  conditions  of  the  system  thus
represented are relational. Changing what is measured, or what choice of framework is made by
the user, yields a different target represented by a different model. This is made explicit by the
one framework rule: the formalism forbids reasoning outside of a framework, for example, by
switching between two frameworks, so as to avoid logical contradictions. Loosely speaking, we
are not allowed to ask “What would have happened with this system if we had measured this
instead  of  this?”,  because  it  would  not  be  the  same  target  of  representation.  The  resulting
structure is quite different too. Properties are not defined at all times, but only at discrete times.
This suggests an ontology of events (or what Griffiths calls “contextual events”, since they are
relative to the framework). The dynamics is not given by a law, but by transition probabilities
between possible events. Given that these probabilities respect standard probability calculus, the
model  can  be  straightforwardly  interpreted  as  a  causal  network,  assuming  a  counterfactual
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theory of causation. In sum, the ontology that comes out naturally from interpreting this kind of
model “literally” is an ontology of causal relations between contextual events.
This approach does not encounter the difficulties of the previous approach. The Born rule is
baked into the model, so its ontological status is clear, and as long as we restrict considerations
to a single framework, the dynamics can be considered local. Distant correlations are always
explained by a common cause (Griffiths 2003, ch. 23). Systems are bounded in time. Contextual
events are well-defined entities that can be directly connected to measurement outcomes, so
there is no need to complete the theory for interpretational purposes. Finally, the connection
with higher level theories is also straightforward if the model is interpreted as a causal network.
One  can  introduce  “quasiclassical  frameworks”  to  account  for  this  connection  in  particular
cases, and the predictions of classical physics are recovered (Griffiths 2003, ch. 26-27). But all
this comes at a price, which is a relativity of the representation to a framework.
The  problem  is  that  the  framework  is  a  holistic,  non-local,  teleological  entity.  Future
measurements are defined in advance, so to speak, but they determine transition probabilities for
events  in  their  past.  In  light  of  our discussion  on  scientific  representation,  and  in  light  of
Griffiths’s  contention  that  the  choice  of  framework  is  pragmatic,  this  framework  could  be
associated  with  the  intentions  and  aims  of  modellers.  The  associated  modality  would  be
practical.  Then the fact that future measurements are defined “in advance” would not be so
much  a  problem.  This  approach  is  compatible  with  pragmatist  stances  towards  quantum
mechanics  (Healey 2012).  However, it requires giving up a naturalistic picture of the world,
since “what the theory says”  is now relative to intentional entities.  Dowker and Kent (1996,
section 5.2) argued that  consistent histories leaves us “puzzled as to why the world appears
quasiclassical and unable to predict that this quasiclassicality will persist”, since it is always
possible, in principle, to model a system using a non-classical framework (see also Okon and
Sudarsky 2014). Arguably, this criticism is ultimately a demand for theoretical predictions that
are not conditioned on  intentional aspects, but correspond to a mind-independent reality that
would be “quasiclassical”.  So,  consistent  histories,  thus  understood,  contradicts  the  implicit
realist assumptions of metaphysicians mentioned in the introduction. I guess that this is the main
reason why the formulation is  not  often adopted when discussing foundational  issues,  even
though  a  similar  formulation,  the  path  integral  formulation,  is  often  used  by  scientists  for
practical purposes.
The following table summarises the differences between the two stances:









Identity conditions Relational Intrinsic
Ontology Contextual events 
+ causal network
Objective states 
+ law of evolution
We started in sections 2 and 3 from an account of the role of modalities in representation,
which  implies that  the  possibilities  that  are  fixed  within  models  should  be  interpreted  as
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epistemic or practical  possibilities,  while  those that  are not  should be interpreted as natural
possibilities.  This account entails  an association between  modelling choices and interpretive
stances that was examined in the case of quantum mechanics in section 4. We can see that these
modelling choices correspond to the wave-function formulation and to consistent histories, and
that  they imply different  ontologies:  evolving states or causal  networks of events.  Does the
present  analysis  confirm  the  validity  of  our methodology?  Griffiths  is  quite  explicit  that
choosing a framework in the consistent histories approach corresponds to adopting a certain
perspective on the represented  system  (Griffiths 2003, pp. 240–241) and that the represented
system  is intrinsically stochastic (ch. 9.3).  The wave-function  formulation is the  formulation
used  for  metaphysical  analysis  by  most  realists,  who  assume that  represented objects  exist
mind-independently.  A  no-go theorem  even  precludes  interpreting  the  wave-function  as  an
epistemic  entity  (Pusey,  Barrett,  and  Rudolph  2012).  So,  the association  implied  by  our
methodology seems to  correspond to the positions defended by proponents and users of  the
formulations of quantum mechanics that we have examined.
The fact that the standard textbook presentation of quantum mechanics is couched in the
wave-function  formulation,  and  that  it  has  instrumentalist  flavours,  seems  to  constitute a
counterexample10. However, as noted  in section  3, I take the association between models and
interpretive stances to be rather loose: it is always possible, but less natural, to interpret models
in a way that does not match this association. It should be noted that formulations of quantum
mechanics are flexible enough to be used in various ways. One can use a mathematical variable
for representing the initial state of a system in the wave-function formulation without specifying
its value, for instance, which allows for counterfactual reasoning on initial states, and make
inferences using only one fixed observable, as if it were fixed in the model, and conversely for
the consistent  histories.  The idea defended here  is  merely that  some formulations  naturally
match or induce some interpretive stances, without requiring qualifications of the kind “I take
the  model  to  represent  an  objective  state  /  my  perspective  on  the  object”,  because  these
qualifications come out naturally. I would argue, in this respect, that the standard presentation of
quantum  mechanics  is  still  impregnated  with an  objectivist  stance.  The  wave-function  is
generally  characterised  as  representing  an  evolving  “state”.  The  only  problem  with  this
presentation is that the notion of measurement is required for predictions, but left unanalysed,
which  makes  the  picture  incomplete  and  creates  an  inherent  tension.  The  Copenhagen
interpretation (Bohr style) can be seen as an attempt to alleviate this tension by interpreting the
wave-function  instrumentally,  taking  observables  to  correspond  to  epistemic  or  practical
possibilities (so, according to our analysis, they should be fixed within models, but they are
not).  However,  this  interpretation  requires  an  explicit  qualification  to  the  effect  that  some
specific  structures  used  in  representation  are  not  actually  representational.  So, it  is  not
necessarily the most natural interpretation of the bare formalism. It might have been considered
unsatisfactory  for  this  reason,  and  the  Copenhagen  interpretation  is  rarely  defended  today.
Griffiths (2019) notably claims that consistent histories, which indeed fixes observables in the
model, is nothing but “Copenhagen done right”.
Our analysis  is limited to two formulations for lack of space.  It would be interesting to
examine other formulations, such as Bohmian mechanics, GRW and QBism, and perhaps to
make finer distinctions between various metaphysical interpretations of quantum mechanics.
10 I am grateful to a reviewer for raising this objection.
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However,  the  results  of  our  analysis  are  enough  to  demonstrate  the  fruitfulness  of  the
association between modalities and representational roles established in this article.
 6 Conclusion: Assessing the Two Stances
In this article, I have proposed to analyse representational activities in terms of various types of
modalities, and I have attempted to demonstrate the fruitfulness of this approach for interpreting
scientific theories, by applying it to non-relativist quantum mechanics. The main idea is that by
looking at the role played by theoretical structures in modelling practices, and in particular,
whether they are fixed or variable within models, one could provide a modal interpretation of
these  structures,  in  terms  of  epistemic/practical  and  natural  possibilities  respectively.  This
approach  appears  to  be  underdetermined  because  of  the  plurality  of  modelling  practices.
However, it can help associate these modelling practices with distinct interpretative stances. In
this respect, two main stances towards quantum mechanics can be distinguished: what I have
called  the  objectivist  and  the  perspectivist  stance.  The  first  one  considers  targets  of
representation to be autonomous objects with intrinsic properties, while the second one takes
them to be physical configurations identified relationally. These two stances can be associated
with the wave-function and consistent histories formulations respectively, and we can see how
they imply different ontologies: objective states evolving according to laws in the first case, and
causal networks of contextual events in the second. Although these formulations are flexible,
their typical uses in foundational inquiry seem to confirm our association between interpretive
stances and modelling choices. This demonstrates the fruitfulness of this approach, which could
be applied to other formulations, interpretations and theories.
By means of conclusion, and in order to move forward, I wish to examine to what extent
the  considerations  of  this  paper  could  advance  metaphysical  inquiry.  Taking  a  pragmatist
approach towards scientific theories does not solve metaphysical problems, but it is informative.
I believe that one crucial merit of the present methodology is that it offers a way of evaluating
different metaphysical options by examining the virtues of associated formulations and models.
One way of assessing our options could consist in just observing scientific practice and
seeing what choices are made by scientists. If, as is likely the case, scientists generally use the
wave-function formulation for their purposes, and if they are successful in their purposes, then
perhaps the wave-function formulation is the right one, and the right metaphysics is objectivist. 
Scientific practice might be indicative indeed. However, one could suspect that modelling
choices also reflect a disciplinary tradition rooted in historical contingencies, such as continuity
with past theories, or persistent metaphysical prejudices. It is far from obvious that using the
consistent histories instead of wave-functions would have impaired the empirical successes of
quantum theory, since they are two formulations of the  same theory. Given the flexibility of
formulations,  a  more  relevant  question  could  be:  do scientists  often  perform counterfactual
inferences  on  observables  and/or  initial  conditions  for  their  purposes?  If  observables  are
generally fixed for practical purposes, and if counterfactual inferences on initial conditions are
often made, then this would play in favour of a perspectivist stance. The two formulations could
also be compared on their heuristic strength, that is, their capacity to lead to new theoretical
developments,  but  this  strength  might  be  hard  to  assess  given  that  one  formulation  is
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predominant  (and as  noted at  the  beginning of  section  5,  the  consistent  histories  has  some
successes on its side, in particular with regard to the theory of decoherence).
Alternatively,  one could take a  more systematic  approach and evaluate  the  capacity  of
various formulations to fulfil particular aims attributed to science. One such aim is unity. I have
given arguments in the previous section to the effect that the consistent histories formulation is
more  compatible  with  other  scientific  theories  (including  relativity  theory)  than  the  wave-
function formulation,  because its  models display a local  causal  network.  Another aim often
invoked in philosophy of science is explanatory power. Even an author such as  van Fraassen
(1980), who would deny that science aims at producing true theories, accepts that the role of
explanations in science is important, to the extent that he felt compelled to develop a pragmatic
theory of explanation that does not require theories to be true. I think that another virtue of
perspectival models in quantum mechanics is that they are straightforwardly explanatory.
It  is generally recognised that explanations rest on counterfactual reasoning: in order to
explain how a spark produced a fire, we can consider what would have happened if there hadn't
been  a  spark.  This  suggests  that  initial  conditions  should  be  variable  for  a  model  to  be
explanatory. Explanations are also focused on a particular property of interest, so an observable
should be given. Take, for example, the explanation of absorption and emission spectrums in
quantum mechanics. They are explained by the fact that electrons emit or absorb photons when
moving from one energy state to another, with frequencies corresponding to the energy gaps
between initial and final energy states. If we want to explain spectrums in general, we have to
take into account all possible initial and final energy states for the electron, so fixing specific
initial conditions in the model would be inappropriate. However, an observable is implicit in
this explanation: it corresponds to the possible energy states of the electron, because they are
involved in the explanation, whereas positions, for example, are not. This means that the models
of a perspectivist stance, and in particular the models of consistent histories, are naturally fit for
explanatory purposes. Note, in this respect, that the explanation of spectrums implicitly involves
discrete  events  and  transitions,  which  is  consistent  with  the  natural  ontology  of  consistent
histories. More generally, the fact that the resulting dynamics corresponds to a causal network is
also consistent with the tight relationship between causality and explanations (Salmon 1984).
Wave-function models rather than consistent histories are generally used in classrooms to
explain emission spectrums.  However, one could suspect  that there are implicit  steps in the
standard explanation (presumably, an application of the Born rule) that are not provided by the
model alone, but require specifying an observable. So, the wave-function formulation, although
generally used, could actually be less fit for explanatory purposes, and this might explain part of
the unease people feel when confronted with quantum theory in its standard formulation.
This is a rather crude analysis for the purpose of illustration. Although I am personally
convinced of the virtues of a perspectivist stance, the point that I wish to defend here is only that
by connecting interpretive stances, modelling choices, ontological commitments and pragmatic
virtues,  we are potentially able to evaluate various interpretive options in a way that is not
available to traditional metaphysical approaches. In other words, this methodology opens the
way for new argumentative strategies that could inform metaphysics.
The  pragmatist  methodology  presented  in  this  paper  is  not  the  only  one  available.
Traditional metaphysics of science is generally focused on extracting ontological commitments
from theories without paying attention to pragmatic aspects or to model construction, but rather,
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for example, to the general structure of these theories. However, as observed in the introduction,
these approaches lead to unresolvable issues. Furthermore, they seem to neglect the fact that
models are more directly representational than theories, and that different modelling choices
within the same theory induce different interpretive stances. They might implicitly narrow the
range of interpretive options for this reason, in favour of an objectivist stance. The lesson from
this article is therefore that metaphysicians should have a closer look at pragmatic aspects, and
in  particular,  modelling  practices.  Not  only  does  this  broaden  the  space  of  interpretative
possibilities, but it also offers a tangible way of assessing them.
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